

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UPDATE
March 26 - April 2, 2015

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1. [Carter, Nakatani Discuss U.S.-Japan Defense Issues](#) (04-01-2015)

DoD News, Defense Media Activity

WASHINGTON, April 1, 2015 – Defense Secretary Ash Carter called Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani to thank him for his long-term support and to discuss the upcoming major events in the U.S.-Japan alliance, according to a Defense Department statement issued today.

Carter reaffirmed commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance and to the Asia-Pacific rebalance, the statement said, and both leaders highlighted the upcoming revision of the guidelines that define the U.S.-Japan defense relationship as a major milestone in modernizing the alliance.

Carter and Nakatani noted that they look forward to meeting during Carter's upcoming visit to Japan, the statement said.

Biographies:

[Ash Carter](#)

Related Sites:

[State Department Fact Sheet on Japan](#)

2. Kendall: Workforce Development Needed to Sustain Tech Superiority (04-01-2015)

By Claudette Roulo
DoD News, Defense Media Activity

NAVAL AIR STATION PATUXENT RIVER, Md., April 1, 2015 – The Defense Department's top acquisition official yesterday made his third visit to Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland, home to U.S. Navy Naval Air Systems Command, or NAVAIR.

Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology Frank Kendall spoke to members of the base's civilian and military workforce, many of whom conduct acquisition, testing and development work for several next-generation aircraft and weapons systems, including the Navy and Marine Corps variants of the F-35 Lightning II joint strike fighter and the MQ-4C Triton unmanned aerial vehicle.

Kendall outlined the importance of developing the next generation of engineers, scientists and acquisition professionals to ensuring that the nation maintains its technological superiority.

Workforce Development

"Science, technology and math education ... I think is hugely important to the future of the country, not just the Department of Defense," he said. "I'm encouraging people to be engaged in that world and do whatever you can to encourage young people to go into science, engineering and math because of the service they can provide to society, and because it's fun."

Kendall said the single-most important decision in his career was one he made in junior high school, when he elected to take honors math and science instead of honors English and history. That decision put him on a technical track that he's stayed on ever since, the undersecretary said.

Mid-career professionals in the defense workforce are outnumbered on either side by the very capable senior professionals who are close to retirement and personnel just starting their careers, Kendall said.

"We've really got a challenge to transfer the knowledge from those senior people to those younger people and develop them as quickly as possible," he said. "I'm a big fan of exchanges with industry ... [and] developmental assignments for people. I think you get an awful lot out of that. You can learn a great deal in a year or even six months in a different environment."

To do this, the department is investigating adding flexibility to its hiring authorities, Kendall said. Defense Secretary Ash Carter also wants to attract young workers from fields that don't traditionally join the defense department, particularly tech workers, he said.

Technological Superiority

The quest to maintain American technological superiority is the driving force behind the third Better Buying Power initiative, the undersecretary said.

Kendall said that when he returned to government after a stint in private industry it became apparent that there were "some people out there who were challenging our technological superiority, and

they're doing it very effectively." These challengers are making smart investments, particularly in anti-access/area-denial capabilities, he said.

The first Gulf War was a "dramatic demonstration of [U.S.] military power," the undersecretary said. No one was watching those events more carefully than the Chinese, Kendall noted, and the Russians weren't far behind. But, he said, "People have had over 20 years now to watch and learn from how the U.S. organizes, equips and fights."

Better Buying Power 3.0

The three versions of Better Buying Power should be considered three legs of the same stool, Kendall said. "The third edition of Better Buying Power ... is much more continuity than change," he added.

The emphasis of the first Better Buying Power was on efficiency and productivity, BBP 2.0 emphasized the importance of professionalism, the undersecretary said, and BBP 3.0 focuses on technical excellence and innovation.

"A lot of the things from the earlier versions we're still going to do, some of them I regard as core parts of Better Buying Power," Kendall said, noting that NAVAIR and other agencies have embraced these principles and are making significant progress toward achieving them.

Cybersecurity

One addition to BBP 3.0 is an emphasis on cybersecurity, the undersecretary said. "If we're giving away our designs we're giving up whatever advantage that they give to us. We're giving up money and we're giving up time and we're giving up capability," he said.

The nation's civilian and military networks are under cyberattack every day, Kendall said.

"We have lost, in particular, a lot of unclassified technical information through, basically, cyber espionage and we have paid a price for that," the undersecretary said. "We have paid a price in terms of technical lead and in terms of cost differentials that we were able to achieve. We have got to do a better job than this."

Cybersecurity is "a constant problem" in every phase of the acquisition and fielding process -- from design to production to deployment -- he said. Giving the problem the attention it needs will cost the nation some money, Kendall said, "but if we don't do it we're going to have new problems and we're going to find out about those problems at a very inconvenient time."

Biographies:

[Frank Kendall](#)

Related Sites:

[Special Report: Force of the Future](#)

[Special Report: The Cyber Domain - Security and Operations](#)

[Special Report: DoD Science and Technology News](#)

3. Airstrikes Continue Against ISIL in Syria, Iraq (04-01-2015)

From a Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve News Release

SOUTHWEST ASIA, April 1, 2015 – U.S. and coalition military forces have continued to attack Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant terrorists in Syria and Iraq, Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve officials reported today.

Officials reported details of the latest strikes, which took place between 8 a.m. yesterday and 8 a.m. today, local time, noting that assessments of results are based on initial reports.

Airstrikes in Syria

Fighter, attack and bomber aircraft conducted seven airstrikes in Syria:

- Near Hasakah, four airstrikes struck four ISIL tactical units and destroyed four ISIL fighting positions.
- Near Kobani, three airstrikes struck three ISIL tactical units, three ISIL vehicles and destroyed three ISIL fighting positions.

Airstrikes in Iraq

Attack, fighter and remotely piloted aircraft conducted seven airstrikes in Iraq, approved by the Iraqi Ministry of Defense:

- Near Hit in Anbar province, an airstrike struck an ISIL tactical unit and destroyed an ISIL vehicle.
- Near Kirkuk, an airstrike struck an ISIL tactical unit and destroyed two ISIL buildings and two ISIL heavy machine guns.
- Near Mosul, an airstrike destroyed an ISIL artillery piece.
- Near Ramadi, two airstrikes struck an ISIL large tactical unit and an ISIL tactical unit.
- Near Tal Afar, two airstrikes struck an ISIL fighting position and an ISIL tent shelter.

Part of Operation Inherent Resolve

The strikes were conducted as part of Operation Inherent Resolve, the operation to eliminate the ISIL terrorist group and the threat they pose to Iraq, Syria, the region, and the wider international community. The destruction of ISIL targets in Syria and Iraq further limits the terrorist group's ability to project terror and conduct operations.

Coalition nations conducting airstrikes in Iraq include the United States, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Jordan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Coalition nations conducting airstrikes in Syria include the United States, Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Related Sites:

[Special Report: Operation Inherent Resolve - Targeted Operations Against ISIL Terrorists](#)

4. State Dept. Fact Sheet on New START Treaty Numbers (04-01-2015)

Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, Washington, D.C.

New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms

Data in this Fact Sheet comes from the biannual exchange of data required by the Treaty. It contains data declared current as of March 1, 2015. Data will be updated each six month period after entry into force of the Treaty.

Category of Data	United States of America	Russian Federation
Deployed ICBMs, Deployed SLBMs, and Deployed Heavy Bombers	785	515
Warheads on Deployed ICBMs, on Deployed SLBMs, and Nuclear Warheads Counted for Deployed Heavy Bombers	1597	1582
Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of ICBMs, Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of SLBMs, and Deployed and Non-deployed Heavy Bombers	898	890

The complete unclassified data for the United States is available upon request from the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC. Please contact Blake Narendra at NarendraBM@state.gov.

5. Carter Details 'Force of the Future' at Syracuse University (03-31-2015)

By Cheryl Pellerin
DoD News, Defense Media Activity

WASHINGTON, March 31, 2015 – Defense Secretary Ash Carter spoke with students, faculty and leaders at Syracuse University in New York this morning, describing his vision and plans for building the “Force of the Future.”

The secretary visited the university on the second day of his first official domestic trip, which began yesterday and included a stop in Pennsylvania to speak with students from his high school alma mater in Abington, near Philadelphia.

Afterward he stopped at Fort Drum in Jefferson County, New York, -- home of the 10th Mountain Division. There, he met with troops who recently served in Afghanistan.

Syracuse University includes the nationally ranked Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs and the S.I. Newhouse School of Public Communications.

Research on Post-service Issues

Also at Syracuse is the Institute for Veterans and Military Families, or IVMF, the first interdisciplinary national institute in higher education focused on post-service social, economic, education and policy issues affecting veterans and their families.

“You have done so much to welcome our veterans and their families,” Carter told the audience.

“And now [you’re doing] what we really need,” he added, “which is to couple thoughtful intellectual work to understand the ... tremendous opportunities represented by this amazing group of people we call our veterans.”

On March 17, the department, the IVMF and the Schultz Family Foundation announced the launch of Onward to Opportunity. The new national program will deliver tailored, industry-specific training and certifications to service members and spouses on U.S. military bases before they transition to civilian life.

Onward to Opportunity

Onward to Opportunity is designed to give participants the skill sets they need to qualify for jobs with leading U.S. companies, offering a seamless transition from military careers to civilian employment.

Carter said he’s been in his new job as secretary for five weeks and he has a lot on his mind and a lot he wants to accomplish.

“But uppermost in my mind is ensuring that we have in generations to come what today gives us the finest fighting force the world has ever known. And that’s not our technology -- that comes second. It’s our people,” he said.

This means the department must recruit and attract the best, the secretary said.

He added, “We need to explain, we need to reach out, we need to recruit.”

Thinking Big

But today’s national security challenges are not purely military in character, Carter said, they are also political, economic and social.

“You see that in the role of social media, you see it in the attention we give to conflict prevention and the connection between issues that we used to think were completely different, like public health or Arctic issues and security,” the secretary added.

That’s another way in which the department needs to think big and broadly, he said, “and our people have a lot of that breadth, a lot of that experience. They’re a great asset for our country, so when they leave us we continue to consider them ours.”

The department’s obligation is to help service members transition from military life to civilian life, said Carter, adding that Syracuse University is a pioneer in helping service members and their families to make that transition — “pioneering in thinking and in doing.”

Changing for a New Generation

“We’ve learned things in the last few years through the research of folks here and through the experience of having 2.6 million service members cycle through two very long wars,” he added.

“We’ve learned, for example,” Carter said, “that it's best for [service members] and therefore best for the country if they start thinking about life after the military as long as they’re in the military.”

This is because people today want to think about their futures, the secretary said.

He added, “They don't like being locked into anything. They like the idea of choice and agility and moving here and there.”

“If we're going to have a new generation we ... can't offer them a conveyor belt that you get on and you don't move until you get off,” Carter said. “We're not going to be appealing if we do that, so we're going to need to change the way we think about things.”

New Transition Assistance Component

The secretary said the department has recently put in place an improved transition program that will evolve over time. It's called the Military Life Cycle Model, a new component of the DoD Transition Assistance Program, or DoDTAP, to be implemented soon forcewide.

The model will help service members start preparing for transition early in their military careers, according to the DoDTAP website. Service members will have key "touch points" throughout their military life cycle that will allow them to align their military career with their civilian goals.

The department is committed to the program, Carter said, and is working with other government, state and local agencies and the private sector to ensure its success.

“I think we can improve our game further, and the way we'll know how to improve is to build our programs on the back of careful research of the kind that ... this institution -- and this institution almost alone in our country -- is actually doing,” the secretary added.

Part of Something Bigger

Military service is one form of public service, he said, and other forms include working with the university and its schools, or working in policymaking, journalism and more.

“Even as we need to think about conflict and the solution of conflict in the broadest possible way,” Carter said, “we need to think about public service in the broadest possible way.”

He added, “I look out on all your faces, and you wouldn't be here if you didn't have at least an inkling of this. There's nothing better than getting out of bed in the morning and knowing you're going to be part of something bigger than yourself.”

It's worth everything, worth all the effort, worth all the trouble, Carter said, “and it's worth not getting paid a zillion dollars, which you're certainly not going to get in public service.”

‘We Care About the Needs of Everyone’

One of the reasons Carter believes the United States is exceptional, he said, is because of the spirit Americans bring to public service.

“We don't just care about ourselves, we care about the needs of everyone, and that's reflected in the way we conduct ourselves around the world,” he said.

“You guys are part of that so I'm grateful to be on your team,” Carter added.

Biographies:

[Ash Carter](#)

Related Sites:

[Special Report: Force of the Future](#)

6. [State's Rose in Romania on Missile Defense \(03-30-2015\)](#)

*Remarks by Frank A. Rose, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Romania-American University/National School of Politics and Administration
Bucharest, Romania*

International Security and Missile Defense

Thank you for that kind introduction, and thanks for having me here today.

As way of an introduction, I am responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense issues, including missile defense policy at the U.S. State Department. In this capacity, I served as the lead U.S. negotiator for the missile defense bases in Romania, Turkey, and Poland.

So I'm pleased to be here today to discuss international security and missile defense. In my remarks, I would like to discuss three key issues:

First, the United States' commitment to ballistic missile defense (BMD) and the Fiscal Year 2016 missile defense budget request;

Second, the significant progress that has been made in implementing the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) over the past year; and;

Third, I will discuss cooperation on missile defense with allies, such as Romania, and partners outside of Europe.

FY 2016 Presidential Budget

The United States and NATO remain committed to establishing ever more capable missile defenses to address the ballistic missile threat to Europe. The transatlantic bond is unbreakable and that is reflected in cooperation at all levels in the NATO alliance.

The U.S. commitment to NATO missile defense and the sites in Romania and Poland remains ironclad.

Last month, President Obama released his Fiscal Year 2016 budget submission that aligns defense program priorities and resources with the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

Let me highlight a couple of key points that you may find of interest:

The Administration is requesting over \$8B for the Missile Defense Agency in FY-16. Despite pressure on the DOD budget, funding for EPAA and missile defense programs remains a priority. With regard to U.S. homeland defense the funding request increases the number of long-range missile defense interceptors deployed in Alaska and California from 30 to 44 by 2017.

It also funds a number of other programs to enhance the long-range system such as a new kill vehicle and new long-range discrimination radar.

With regard to regional missile defense, the budget continues funding to complete work on the missile defense base at Devesulu in Romania and provides \$169 million for construction and \$164.089 million over FY16-18 for procurement of Aegis Ashore for Poland.

The Administration also is requesting \$559 million in procurement for Aegis ballistic missile defense. This includes the procurement of 40 Aegis SM-3 Block IB missiles, for a total of 209 SM-3 Block IB missiles procured by the end of FY 2016. We also are seeking \$ 173M for continued development of the longer-range SM-3 Block IIA interceptor.

The fact that the United States continues to devote such significant resources to the missile defense program, even in the face of fiscal constraints, is a clear signal of the importance the U.S. places on the program, including the sites in Romania and Poland.

European Phased Adaptive Approach

Let me now take a few moments to discuss where we are with regard to implementation of the President's European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense.

In 2009, the President announced that the EPAA would "provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and America's Allies," while relying on "capabilities that are proven and cost-effective."

Since then, we have been working hard to implement his vision. As you know, we have made great progress.

EPAA Phase 1 gained its first operational elements in 2011 with the start of a sustained deployment of an Aegis BMD-capable multi-role ship to the Mediterranean and the deployment of an AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey.

With the declaration of Interim BMD Capability at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012, this radar transitioned to NATO operational control.

Demonstrating its commitment to NATO collective defense, Spain agreed in 2011 to host four U.S. Aegis BMD-capable ships at the existing naval facility at Rota as a Spanish contribution to NATO missile defense.

April 2, 2015

In February 2014, the first of four missile defense-capable Aegis ships, USS DONALD COOK, arrived in Rota, Spain. A second ship, USS ROSS joined her in June. During 2015, two more of these multi-mission ships, USS PORTER and USS CARNEY will be forward deployed in Rota.

These multi-mission ships will conduct maritime security operations, humanitarian missions, bilateral and multilateral training exercises, and support U.S. and NATO operations, including NATO missile defense.

Stationing these naval assets in Spain places them in a position to maximize their operational flexibility for missions in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.

With regard to Phase 2, as you know, we have an agreement with Romania, ratified in December 2011, to host a U.S. land-based SM-3 interceptor site beginning later this year.

We extend our appreciation to Romania for its active role in preparing for the construction of the missile defense facility at the Deveselu Military Base.

Romania's strong support for the timely completion of the implementing arrangements and Romania's provision of security and its infrastructure efforts have been superb.

In October 2013, I had the honor of attending the ground-breaking ceremony at Deveselu Air Base.

And in October 2014, the U.S. Navy held a historic naval support facility establishment ceremony at the MD facility on Romania's Deveselu Base. This ceremony established the naval facility and installed its first U.S. commander. We view this as the first step in transitioning the facility from a construction site to the site of operations later this year.

When operational, this site, combined with BMD-capable ships in the Mediterranean, will enhance coverage of NATO from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East.

I also had the opportunity in 2013 to visit the Lockheed-Martin facility in Moorestown, New Jersey, where they build the Aegis Ashore deck house and components destined for Romania.

We remain on schedule for deploying the system to Romania, with the site becoming operational this year.

And finally there is Phase 3.

This phase includes an Aegis Ashore site in Poland equipped with the new SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, per the Ballistic Missile Defense agreement between the United States and Poland that entered into force in September 2011.

This site is on schedule for deployment in the 2018 time frame. The interceptor site in Poland is key to the EPAA: When combined with other EPAA assets, Phase 3 will provide the necessary capabilities to provide ballistic missile defense coverage of all NATO European territory in the 2018 time frame.

So, as you can see, we are continuing to implement the President's vision for stronger, smarter and swifter missile defenses.

However, all this good news and progress is not without its detractors.

You might have heard Russia's assertions which call into question the compliance of Aegis Ashore with the INF Treaty.

As we have explained to our Russian colleagues, as well as our allies, the United States is in full compliance with the INF Treaty and the Aegis Ashore system is entirely consistent with our obligations under the Treaty. In fact, the record shows that United States has been open with the world about the purpose, capabilities, and mission of the Aegis Ashore missile defense system from day one.

Despite our transparency on system, Russia is seeking to conflate the Aegis Ashore vertical launching system designed to fire the SM-3 missile defense interceptor with the Aegis MK-41 vertical launching system on Navy ships that can be used to fire Tomahawk cruise missiles.

The two launchers are not the same. They are different systems with different purposes and different capabilities.

The Aegis Ashore system cannot launch a cruise missile because the system does not include the necessary software, fire control hardware, and additional support equipment and infrastructure to perform that mission. Consequently, the Aegis Ashore launcher has not been used to launch a cruise missile.

What the Aegis Ashore launcher is designed and tested to do is fire interceptor missiles, like the SM-3. The INF Treaty permits missiles developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth. In other words, missile interceptors, like the SM-3, are allowed under the INF Treaty.

So both the Aegis Ashore launcher and SM-3 missile interceptor are permitted under the INF Treaty.

That raises the question of what is driving Russia's allegations.

Simply stated, Russia is seeking to divert attention away from its own unlawful actions, and sow doubt and distrust among the press and public.

It is no coincidence that, soon after the United States announced its determination last July that Russia is in violation of the INF Treaty for developing and flight testing a ground-launched cruise missile between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, Russia resurrected old allegations and made new charges of U.S. non-compliance.

Even in the face of clear challenges, our goal is to return Russia to INF compliance, and to encourage mutual steps to help foster a more stable, resilient, transparent security relationship.

We will continue to press Russia to engage us constructively and address our concerns.

We're not going to drop the issue until our concerns have been addressed.

We would like Russia, and our Allies, to know that our patience is not unlimited. We will take steps to protect ourselves and our allies if Russia persists in its violation and our concerns are not addressed.

NATO Cooperation and Reassurance

For the better part of seven decades, the NATO Alliance has responded ably to threats to international peace and security on the European continent and beyond.

The greatest responsibility of the NATO Alliance is to protect and defend our territories and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO Allies defend their territory on a 24/7 basis and will continue to exercise vigilance. We are committed to further strengthening the transatlantic bond and providing the resources, capabilities, and political will required to ensure the Alliance remains ready to meet any challenge.

At the Lisbon Summit in 2010, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed that the Alliance would develop a missile defense capability to protect Alliance territory, populations, and forces from ballistic missile attack.

At the Chicago and Wales Summits, Allied Heads of State and Government noted the potential opportunities for using synergies in planning, development, procurement, and deployment.

We need to take full advantage of this opportunity.

There are several approaches Allies can take to make important and valuable contributions to NATO BMD.

First, Allies can acquire fully capable BMD systems possessing sensor, shooter and command and control capabilities.

Second, Allies can acquire new sensors or upgrade existing ones to provide a key BMD capability.

Finally, Allies can contribute to NATO's BMD capability by providing essential basing support, such as Turkey, Romania, Poland, and Spain have agreed to do.

In all of these approaches, however, the most critical requirement is NATO interoperability.

Yes, acquiring a BMD capability is, of course, good in and of itself.

But if the capability is not interoperable with the Alliance then its value as a contribution to Alliance deterrence and defense is significantly diminished.

It is only through interoperability that the Alliance can gain the optimum effects from BMD cooperation that enhance NATO BMD through shared battle-space awareness and reduced interceptor wastage.

Missile Defense Developments in Other Regions

The United States, in consultation with our allies and partners, is continuing to bolster missile defenses in other key regions, such as the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific, in order to strengthen regional deterrence architectures.

As with Europe, we are tailoring our approaches to the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific so that they reflect the unique deterrence and defense requirements of each region.

In the Middle East, we are already cooperating with our key partners bilaterally and multilaterally through venues such as the recently established U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Strategic Cooperation Forum.

At the September 26, 2013, Strategic Cooperation Forum (SCF), Secretary Kerry and his Foreign Ministry counterparts reaffirmed their intent, first stated at the September 28, 2012, SCF, to “work toward enhanced U.S.-GCC coordination on Ballistic Missile Defense.”

Several of our partners in the region have expressed an interest in buying missile defense systems, and some have already done so. For example, the UAE has contracted to buy two THAAD batteries that, when operational, will enhance the UAE’s security as well as regional stability.

The UAE also has taken delivery of its Patriot PAC-3 batteries, which provide a lower-tier, point defense of critical national assets. We look forward to advancing cooperation and interoperability with our GCC partners in the years ahead.

Additionally and separately, we are continuing our long-standing and robust cooperation with Israel on missile defense on key systems such as Arrow 3, David’s Sling, and Iron Dome.

In the Asia-Pacific, we are continuing to cooperate through our bilateral alliances and key partnerships.

For example, the United States and Japan already are working closely together to develop the SM-3 Block IIA and deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar to Japan, while continuing to work on enhancing interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces.

As a result of U.S.-Australia Foreign and Defense ministerial consultations this year, the United States and Australia are establishing a bilateral BMD Working Group to examine options for potential Australian contributions to the BMD architecture in the Asia-Pacific region.

Additionally, we are also continuing to consult closely with the Republic of Korea (ROK) as it develops the Korean Air and Missile Defense system, which is designed to defend the ROK against air and missile threats from North Korea.

No Constraints

Let me say a few things about missile defense and Russia.

With regard to where things stand today regarding our discussions on missile defense, Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, in violation of international law, has led to the suspension of our military-to-military dialogue, and we are not currently engaging Russia on the topic of missile defense.

Prior to the suspension of that dialogue, Russia continued to demand that the United States provide it “legally binding” guarantees that our missile defense will not harm/diminish its strategic nuclear deterrent.

We have made clear to the Russians that EPAA is not directed toward Russia. We have also made it clear that we cannot and will not accept legally-binding or other constraints that limit our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners.

The security of the United States, its allies and partners is a foremost responsibility. As such, the United States will continue to insist on having the flexibility to respond to evolving ballistic missile threats, free from obligations that limit our BMD capabilities.

Conclusion

Let me conclude by saying that we have made a great deal of progress on missile defense over the past several years.

Implementation of the EPAA and NATO missile defense is going well. For example, we broke ground on the missile defense site at Devesulu in October 2013 and are on schedule for the base to become operational later this year.

The United States looks forward to continuing to work with our allies and friends around the world – and especially Romania – to improve our collective security.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

7. U.S. Envoy on Adoption of U.N. Resolution on Libya (03-27-2015)

U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Office of Press and Public Diplomacy, New York, New York

Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Michele J. Sison, U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at the Adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2214 on Libya, March 27, 2015

The United States reaffirms its unwavering support to the critical work of Special Representative of the Secretary-General Bernardino Leon and his tireless efforts to facilitate the formation of a national unity government as part of the next phase of Libya's political transition through UN-led dialogue. Today's UN Security Council resolutions reaffirm support for Leon's efforts to facilitate a political dialogue to form a national unity government. The Council also "urges all parties in Libya to engage constructively with Leon's efforts," and "calls for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire." The United States stands firmly behind the UN-led political dialogue process, Special Representative Leon, and his efforts to usher the parties toward a lasting and peaceful settlement to Libya's political and security crisis.

In recent months, we have seen how violent extremist groups such as Da'esh (ISIL), Ansar al-Sharia elements, and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb are the only ones who benefit from a divided Libya. The most effective, comprehensive, and sustainable way to counter terrorism is through a Libyan unity of effort, supported by the international community. It is therefore critical that Libyans form a national unity government as soon as possible.

With our vote today to renew the mandate for Special Representative Leon's efforts through the mandate renewal of the UN Support Mission to Libya, we signal our continued commitment and determination to support a political resolution to the crisis in Libya. Thank you, Mr. President.

8. State's Friedt in Vienna on Disarmament and Nonproliferation (03-27-2015)

Remarks by Anita E. Friedt, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Vienna, Austria, March 20, 2015

Disarmament Verification and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Ahead

Thank you so much for welcoming me to your class today.

I'm Anita Friedt, and I serve as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Bureau at the U.S. Department of State.

I want to thank Nikolai and Tamara for their terrific presentations. Their remarks highlight just how far we have come since the dawn of the treaty based arms control in the 1960's. The earliest pioneers of arms control, who crafted the Limited Test Ban Treaty, were unaware of concepts such as "geospatial modeling." Likewise, verification has also evolved through several rounds of bilateral U.S.-Russian strategic arms treaties. The earliest—the Strategic Offensive Arms Limitation Treaty—relied on "national technical means," such as satellite imagery, to verify state compliance. Successive treaties have permitted more intrusive measures that give inspectors on-site access and access to see more things, such as counting deployed nuclear warheads.

Now we need a new generation of creative thinking to help us meet the unique verification challenges that we face in the 21st Century.

Background

Before I go further, it's worth outlining the broader role of the Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) Bureau in advancing U.S. and international security.

As part of its duties, the AVC Bureau of the U.S. Department of State oversees the entire life cycle of arms control treaties and agreements. At the beginning of the life cycle, it negotiates new treaties such as New START which continues to thrive on its 5th year, taking care that they are effectively verifiable.

After entry into force of treaties and agreements, the AVC Bureau is responsible for carefully monitoring and assessing compliance. Aiding the United States in this pursuit are advanced tools and technologies that provide greater confidence that all parties are complying with a treaty or agreement.

Whether it's the near 300 International Monitoring Stations of the CTBTO next door or on-site inspections conducted under New START—a strong verification regime is an indispensable ingredient to any successful arms control treaty or agreement. Expanding an inspector's verification toolkit will create the conditions needed to reduce the role and number of U.S. nuclear weapons.

The IPNDV

For its part, the United States is actively working to expand that toolkit and we are very excited at our new venture: the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament, or IPNDV. This new partnership has been launched in conjunction with over 25 countries.

The IPNDV just completed day one of its two-day kickoff meeting in Washington D.C. The Partnership draws upon the expertise of talented individuals to reach a common understanding of the challenges and constraints of future monitoring and verification activities.

The Partnership is unique in that it features both participation from nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states alike. The United States and Russia have accrued decades of verification and monitoring experience, but we certainly do not have a monopoly on good ideas. Also unique is the public-partnership we have formed with the Nuclear Threat Initiative to implement the IPNDV. We are very pleased to have a direct line to NTI's great minds working on these issues all over the globe.

While the IPNDV is unprecedented in its scope, lessons learned from past disarmament verification initiatives will inform the development of "work streams" — or subject areas deserving of closer study.

The United States — United Kingdom Technical Cooperation Program and the United Kingdom-Norway Initiative are two such past initiatives; both grappled with how to provide confidence and transparency in a country's declared nuclear weapons and material while, at the same time, protecting sensitive and classified information.

The verification regime of the New START Treaty provides a good basis for a discussion on how future verification challenges could be more complicated than in times past.

Under New START, the inspecting state party verifies a negative — that an item deployed on a ballistic missile, is non-nuclear as the inspected state declares. However, as we get to lower numbers, future treaties will require verifying a positive — that an object declared as a nuclear warhead is in fact a nuclear warhead. This will be complicated by the fact that warheads are not only a fraction of the size of an intercontinental missile — their internal components are closely guarded national secrets.

These challenges in verifying and monitoring nuclear weapons across their entire life cycles will require innovative solutions. And while the magnitude of our task is daunting, it's not without precedent.

In 1976, the Group of Scientific Experts assembled to solve a seemingly unsolvable task; how can data from hundreds of seismic monitoring stations all around the world be routed to a central location?

Through international collaboration and an infusion of technical expertise, the Group of Scientific Experts influenced the creation of a verification regime that makes it near impossible for a country to elude detection through a nuclear explosives test. Today, the CBTO's International Data Center, processes information from nearly 300 IMS stations on all seven continents. As I can personally attest having visited the International Data Center myself, it has performed up to specs.

Importance of the NPT

There is no viable alternative to practical, verifiable step-by-step disarmament. That is why we created the IPNDV — to help us make the next steps possible. Those next steps are obligation under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and one the United States continues to embrace.

Our clear commitment to disarmament is one of the key messages we will bring to the 2015 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference in just one month's time.

Forty-five years into its existence, the NPT, remains the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime. The treaty covers three mutually reinforcing pillars — disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy — and is the basis for international cooperation on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

The NPT owes its longevity to continued salience of the grand bargain: countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all countries can access nuclear energy for peaceful uses. As a result, the NPT remains an indispensable tool in the promotion of international peace and security.

When negotiations on the NPT began in the early 1960's, President John F. Kennedy predicted that as many as 25 countries could acquire nuclear weapons before the end of the decade. It is a credit to the strength and effectiveness of the Treaty — that Kennedy's forecast never came to pass.

This is why the United States will be working hard to help facilitate a positive NPT Review Conference in New York. Through close work and collaboration, the 2010 Review Conference was a success. By focusing on common goals and consensus, we are fully capable of repeating that success.

The United States understands that the three pillars of the NPT are not competing interests; they are mutually reinforcing — progress on one pillar advances the other two.

President Obama declared in Prague in 2009 that the United States is committed to the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. The U.S. commitment to disarmament is unassailable. The President acknowledged that this goal would not happen overnight, but rather as a product of “concrete steps” towards that final end. Of course, it is important to remember how far we've come — the U.S. nuclear stockpile today has been slashed 85% since the 1950's.

More than disassembly of weapons, the United States is committed to preventing the assembly of new ones. That is why we completed the most successful nonproliferation partnership in history. The “Megatons to Megawatts Program” converted 20,000 nuclear weapons worth of weapons grade HEU from Russia into low-enriched fuel for U.S. nuclear reactors. From 1993 to 2013, 10% of all U.S. electricity was produced by material once earmarked for megaton bombs.

As I discussed earlier, the maturation of the CTBTO IMS system is nothing short of incredible. In the United States, we are engaged in a serious effort to inform the public and Members of Congress of how the CTBTO verification architecture has advanced since the CTBT opened for signature two decades ago. Speaking last year from the same strip of islands from where the U.S. Castle Bravo nuclear test occurred, Under Secretary Rose Gottemoeller emphasized the benefits of the Treaty — it would stop nuclear arms races in their tracks, thwart countries from testing new warhead designs, and spare future generations from health problems that can develop from nuclear testing.

We are also working to support nuclear-weapon-free zones that advance regional security and bolster the global nonproliferation regime. We were pleased to join with our P5 counterparts last May in signing the protocol to the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, and we continue to work with ASEAN toward signature of the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty protocol.

Part of moving beyond the “Cold War mindset,” that President Obama referenced in Prague in 2009, is shifting the way nuclear weapons are used in U.S. national security strategy.

Last summer, the United States completed its work to de-MIRV all intercontinental missiles so they carry just one warhead a piece. When combined with our practice of open-sea targeting for sea and land based ballistic missiles and taking heavy bombers off day-to-day alert, the United States has reduced nuclear dangers.

Finally, the implementation of the New START Treaty continues in a businesslike manner by both sides despite tensions in Ukraine. By 2018, the number of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons will be capped at their lowest levels since Dwight Eisenhower was President in the 1950s.

During that same decade the United States and former Soviet Union were locked in an arms race. Even so, President Eisenhower recognized that the peaceful applications of the atom should be shared with all nations.

One of his most heralded achievements was his “Atoms for Peace” speech, delivered in 1953, which led to the foundation of an international organization – the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – charged with the objective to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of nuclear energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.

Conclusion

The United States remains committed as ever to strengthening all three pillars of the NPT. For nearly half a century, the NPT has accomplished the mission it sought out to achieve. Today, there are fewer states that possess nuclear weapons, several have forsworn their nuclear weapon capabilities, and peaceful uses are diffuse as ever.

We realize we have more work to do, but we do not face this challenge alone. The NPT clearly states that it is incumbent upon all nations to work step by step, to realize the peace and security of a world free of nuclear weapons. Initiatives like IPNDV is just one step among many that will allow us to reach our goal.

Speaking in Hiroshima, Japan last year, Under Secretary Gottemoeller challenged college students to chart a future distinct from the past. “Your generation, born with the skills to control the new technologies that are also changing our world, will be able to choose a path away from past mistakes, past conflicts. Your generation will inherit a world of nuclear arsenals that you did not have a hand in building, but you will have the power to create a world where they can be dismantled.”

The same applies to the people in this room. Thanks again for having me....

9. [State's Blinken at Atlantic Council NATO Transformation Seminar \(03-26-2015\)](#)

Remarks by Antony J. Blinken, Deputy Secretary of State, at the Atlantic Council's NATO Transformation Seminar 2015

DEPUTY SECRETARY BLINKEN: Well, Fred, thank you very, very much for an overly generous introduction, and let me just say at the outset that it is particularly wonderful to be here with you and to just take note of everything that you've done with the Atlantic Council to create and recreate,

really, one of the most vital institutions in Washington, and indeed beyond. And I think today's events and yesterday's events are testimony to that as well. So I'm gratefully – I'm especially grateful to be joined by Secretary General Stoltenberg. It's an honor to share this table with you, as well as Jean-Paul Palomeros and particularly all of the ambassadors, generals, distinguished guests. Thank you for this opportunity to join you at a very important forum at a very important moment.

The focus of what you've been doing for the last couple of days – the readiness of NATO's forces, the strength of our commitments, the unity of our efforts, is a great concern and a priority for every country that is represented at this table, and that's true whether we're in Washington, whether we're in Brussels, whether in Berlin, whether in Warsaw, or points in between. I just got back from a week in Europe, a very productive trip. It went, if you follow the geography, from Paris to Chisinau, to London, to Berlin, to Kyiv. So there was obviously something wrong with our planning, but it was very important to be there at this particular time. We discussed a lot of common priorities from trade to energy, but a major topic was the importance of transatlantic unity as we collectively address Russian aggression in Ukraine.

I was in Berlin and a student asked me, "Why are you so focused on Ukraine? Why does it actually matter? Russia's actions don't pose a threat to you; they don't really pose a threat to Germany. What's so important about what's happening in Ukraine?" And so I tried to explain that our concern in the first instance was helping a European state attain its democratic aspirations, that Ukraine is not whole if its people are not free. If the country is not at peace, then in some fundamental sense neither is Europe.

But I also explained that as each of you know, the crisis that we're facing now goes beyond Ukraine and beyond even Europe. As Russia and the separatists that it backs descend on eastern Ukraine, they're doing more even than violating the borders of one country. They are threatening the principles on which the transatlantic partnership was founded and upon which the international order we seek to build depends. Moscow's actions, from manufacturing the phony Maidan-in-reverse in eastern Ukraine, deploying thousands of heavy weapons and troops across the border, to supporting a reign of violence through the separatists that it controls – they threaten to set a new precedent whereby basic principles are up for debate.

These principles, that the borders and territorial integrity of a democratic state cannot be changed by force; that is – it is the inherent right of citizens in a democracy to make their country's decisions and determine its future; that linguistic nationalism, something we thought was confined to the dustbin of history, must not be allowed to be resurrected; and that all members of the international community are bound by common rules and should face costs if they don't live up to the solemn commitments they make – and I want to pause on this last one for just a second because it resonates particularly and in interesting ways in the context of the Ukraine crisis.

As all of you know very well, when the Soviet Union dissolved, it left successor states, three of which had nuclear weapons – Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine – thousands of nuclear weapons. One of the great achievements of the Clinton administration and of our European partners at the time was to convince those successor states to give up the nuclear weapons they inherited. And of course in the case of Ukraine, that required a solemn vow and commitment from three countries to support Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty – the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia. That we would allow that commitment to be trampled upon not only does a grave injustice to Ukraine, but think about what it says at this very moment when, as we speak, our Secretary of State, the secretaries of state from our major partners are working to convince Iran to forego nuclear weapons. It would be understandable that Iran would want certain assurances in order to do that.

What does it say to Iran today when a commitment like the one that was made in the Budapest memorandum is grossly violated?

So this crisis in Ukraine resonates in ways that go far beyond even Ukraine and even Europe. So with so much at stake, it is imperative in our judgment that we continue to stand together to affirm these principles, to end the conflict peacefully, to restore Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. And the best way to do that is through full and comprehensive adherence to the September Minsk agreements and to the February Minsk implementation plan that President Hollande and Chancellor Merkel did such a good job in negotiating.

I want to emphasize one point here. The most critical step in that plan is the last step – the restoration of Ukraine's international border. Until that is done, this crisis will not be resolved because Russia will have the ability until that is done, at will, to turn up the volume, to pour troops and arms back across the border and into Ukraine. And so until that last step is completed, it's imperative that we sustain the pressure on Russia, that we continue to support Ukraine, and if Russia continues to violate its obligations, then we should increase the costs.

Let me emphasize – and I think I speak for everyone here – this is not something that any of us wanted. This is not something that any of us want to continue, unless we have to. It is our most fervent desire that everyone comply with the Minsk agreement and that we're able to start to roll back the sanctions and the pressure and try to get back to a more normal and more cooperative relationship. But again, until there is compliance, we need to keep the pressure on.

We also know, of course, the threats to our transatlantic community do not just come from the east. Together, we are working to confront violent extremism, foreign fighters, and the specter of ISIL – or Daesh. And the challenge here is twofold: We have to counter extremism, but we also have to work to prevent it, and of course this is a mission that goes beyond the mandate of NATO, but is highly relevant. We have to defeat the hard core of extremists who are simply beyond the reach of reason, and in many ways, actually, together, that's exactly what we're doing, including, as we speak, in Iraq. And that of course has a very significant military component and counterterrorism component, interrupting foreign fighters, the financing, et cetera.

But we also have to reach a much larger pool of people who are susceptible to the siren call of extremism – people who may be alienated from their communities and their countries, who may face governance that is abusive or corrupt, who lack opportunity, who lack some positive perspective for the future. And this is a much larger and more complicated project.

We had a very interesting summit in Washington about a month ago on countering violent extremism, and it looked at both parts of the problem – that is, countering the actual extremists who are committing violent acts today, but also this larger prevention agenda which is so critical. And many of our countries are working together in the months ahead to flesh out that part of the agenda as well. And to look at the experiences that so many of us have had because in some country, in some place there's probably an approach developed to one aspect of the problem that actually works, and part of the task is making sure that we're sharing the information and best practices.

One very quick example: I think as all of you know, when it comes to foreign fighters, one of the main modes of radicalization is in prison. Two of the three Charlie Hebdo attackers were common criminals who went to jail and became radicalized in prison. And different countries have different experiences with this, and some countries have been more successful than others in dealing with the problem of radicalization in prison. So that's just one example of the more we can share common perspectives and information, the better off we'll be.

But when you think of all of this and put it together, whether it's ISIL or whether it's Ukraine, I think it's a call to us to take important steps to strengthen our collective defense. It's a reminder of the dangers of complacency, of neglecting our responsibilities in defense, of taking basic principles for granted. And it's a reminder of why NATO was founded 66 years ago – out of the carnage of war, an alliance committed to peace through security. It enshrined every member with responsibility over our collective defense. It established every member, in effect, as a frontline state, and of course it's worked. It's allowed us to build a global system – not just a European system, but a global system of commerce, of democratic governance, and inclusive development that provides an entry point to literally every nation and its citizens. We set an example for others, and increasingly we've translated our collective security beyond our common borders – greater stability and security in Afghanistan thanks to NATO and our partners; a peaceful, developing southeastern Europe; and we've seen decline in piracy off the coast of Africa.

But we had a decade, of course, of NATO defining itself by how it led in other parts of the world. The standing of our alliance at home and in Europe I think now has to be foremost again in our minds. The strength of our alliance, its legacy is simply not inevitable; it requires significant upkeep. And just when we need it most, there are some signs of fraying that we have to be very serious about addressing.

I know these points get repeated over and over again, but I think they bear yet one more repetition, and it's important. In the early 1990s, our European allies spent 2.5 percent of GDP on average on defense. Today, it's about 1.6 percent. Over the past decade, the U.S. share of total NATO defense spending has risen from 64 percent to 70 percent. This is increasingly not only economically but not politically sustainable. Only four allies currently meet NATO defense investment requirements, and six members are potentially moving in the wrong direction, trimming their budgets.

We know that the targets we've set stretch the capacity of many of us, but I think it's important to focus on the fact that we're not talking about an arbitrary percentage or dollars for dollars' sake, or euros for euros' sake. What we're trying to do together is to make sure that we have the means and the interoperability to continue to act together effectively and to adjust and adapt to evolving threats. The bottom line is that if NATO is to remain the most powerful and effective alliance the world has ever known, then all 28 must maintain the Wales commitments. We have to meet the 2 percent GDP benchmark by 2024 with one-fifth dedicated to new equipment. We have to shift new spending toward investments for the future, not just legacy costs like pensions. We have to ensure persistent rotational land, sea, and air presence along NATO's eastern edge. We have to adapt a defensive posture to counter emerging challenges in the east and in the south, and we believe we must maintain NATO's open door to nations that meet our high standards.

We take these commitments very, very seriously. Today, American troops are forward-deployed from the Baltic to the borders of Turkey to defend the security of every NATO ally, just as we would our own. The European Reassurance Initiative that the President advanced, \$1 billion in addition to strengthen the alliance, to bolster the defense capabilities and capacities of allies and partners, including Ukraine, including Georgia, including Moldova. In the near future, and indeed as we speak, many allies are reviewing strategic defense and security plans. It's not just about targets and budgets. These reviews will have real consequences, and I think it's no exaggeration to say that the future of the alliance hangs in the balance.

Beyond NATO, we have to continue to fortify the broader transatlantic space. We have to maintain and strengthen our defenses, even as we invest in the roots of our strength – in our economies, in

our democracies, and indeed in our global leadership. We have to deepen our core partnerships even as we seek to expand relations with and build capacity of emerging partners who share our values.

So how do we accomplish this? Just a few thoughts in conclusion: First, promoting deeper transatlantic economic integration is vital to our common security in the broadest sense of the term, and there's no better opportunity to do that than to work swiftly toward an ambitious Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreement. This is about supporting Europe's fight for inclusive growth as it continues to recover from the hangover of the Eurozone crisis. The U.S. and the EU already account for one-third of total goods and services and nearly half of global economic output. TTIP, as we call it, will energize this growth by increasing exports by tens of billions of dollars and adding to the already 13 million jobs that transatlantic trade and investment support. And these are not just economic gains. There are profound geopolitical efforts that extend from a common embrace of 21st century rules and 21st century values.

Another area where working together to strengthen the transatlantic space is so critical is in the area of energy security for Europe. Everyone remembers the gas crisis of 2009, and even more immediate in our collective consciousness is the concern about the most recent crisis with Russia and the impact that that could have on our common energy security. In 2009, we all remember Russian gas flows through Ukraine were halted for nearly two weeks, and the specter of a repeat has been hanging over us this past winter.

There is a stark, cold reminder of the old days when dependence on one source meant never knowing whether the gas would keep flowing. Energy security, diversified resources, diversified routes, diversified suppliers is critical to strengthening the transatlantic space. And the good news is we've made significant strides just in the past year. A year ago, the Baltics were virtually an energy island entirely dependent on a single supplier for all their electricity and natural gas needs in terms of imports. Now they are on track to be one of the most integrated energy regions by the end of this decade. We have completed the Estonia-Finnish undersea cable, we built new floating LNG facilities in Lithuania, we've made progress on the gas interconnector between Poland and Lithuania. And it's critical, I think, that we take this approach with a number of other strategically located infrastructure improvements, including pipelines, electric grids, the integration of renewables.

Finally, in terms of strengthening our own space, continuing to lead together globally is vital, as we have when humanitarian crises like Ebola have overwhelmed developing nations and posed a widespread risk; as we have confronting global challenges like climate change that will require historic course corrections; and as we have to preserve the very values that our enemies want to undermine. Nearly two-thirds of the global coalition to counter ISIL (or Daesh) is European. These transatlantic contributions to the larger collective good are invaluable not simply as acts of generosity, but as acts that advance our own common security.

At the very end – toward the end of the trip that I took to Europe a couple of weeks ago, I was in Kyiv and visited the Maidan. And it was a good moment to reflect on the people who are actually behind and affected by the policies all of us have the responsibility to debate and determine: students, business owners, grandmothers who braved sniper bullets and truncheons to demand that their government at the time uphold its promise of a European future. It's a call that we all recognize in this room, a call for government to honor the aspirations of its citizens in word and in deed. And it's a story that sometimes gets lost in these policy debates, because this really does come back to people and basic principles, and I think it's a story that needs to be told and retold – a story that goes to the heart of the transatlantic partnership that so many countries in this room fought to build. It goes to why we built it in the first place and why we need to stand together to defend it today and in all the days that follow.

So I don't think anyone needs to be told the importance of this moment, because everyone in this room in particular recognizes it. From Ukraine's eastern borders to Europe's Mediterranean periphery, the threats we face are already at NATO's doorstep. They demand unity of effort, they demand accountability for our pledges, and maybe most of all they demand an uncompromising commitment to the values that united us in the first place. In this mission, I can think of no community of leaders better equipped to navigate the way forward than the men and women in this room and the countries that you represent. We look to your expertise, to your experience, to your creativity in meeting the urgency of this moment. Thank you very much.

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